This article examines the evolution of energy use and pollution emissions in Sweden over the past two centuries -a much longer period than has been investigated in the large literature on the environmental Kuznets curve. In this article we show that both energy consumption and pollution emissions in Sweden declined relative to GDP over the last two hundred years. In absolute terms both energy use and pollution increased up until , after which date energy consumption stabilised and pollutant emissions declined, leading to less environmental stress. The energy intensity results are decomposed to determine the relative impact of structural changes in the output structure versus within-sector changes. For the period after  another decomposition for pollution emissions is performed to separate out changes in preferences from energy-related changes. The analyses show that technical change in a broad sense has been crucial for explaining the long-term decline in both energy intensity and pollutant intensity, while the transition to the service economy had negligible effects. Changed preferences affected the decline in emissions after .
. Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and the environment has been hypothesised to resemble an inverted U-curve. In the early stages of economic growth pollution increases, but beyond a certain level of income the trend reverses and pollution declines. This idea reached a broad audience through the  World Development Report and was later named the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) after Simon Kuznets, who proposed a similar hypothesis between economic growth and the environment (Panayotou ) . This hypothesis spurred a multitude of EKC studies, too numerous to discuss here. An assessment of these studies shows that they are often of poor econometric quality and that in fact the EKC does not exist in the sense that income per capita per se determines the level of pollution (Perman and Stern ) . Instead, it seems that most environmental indicators are monotonically increasing in income though the income elasticity is less than . Time-related effects, for instance the level of technology, reduce environmental impacts in all countries at all levels of income, though the rate of change may differ across countries and income might be one factor generating differences in the adoption of technology across countries (Stern and Common , Stern a) . In rapidly growing middle income countries, the scale effect outbalances the time effect and pollution increases. In richer countries growth is slower, and the time effect may be strong enough to result in reduced emissions. This is the reason for the apparent EKC pattern (Brock and Taylor , Stern b) . These conclusions are based on the analysis of panel datasets for periods since .
However, these conclusions seem tentative and are still controversial. If, as Brock and Taylor () claim, the patterns of change are fundamentally related to the long-term growth process, much longer term studies of the interrelationship between growth and the environment are called for. This article discusses the relationships between growth, energy and pollutants in Sweden during the last  years. The principle direct reasons for changes in pollution or energy consumption over time are:
() Scale of production; () Changes in the output mix (structural change); () Changes in the input mix (movements along the isoquants of a neoclassical production function); () Technological change, which involves changes in both:
(a) overall productivity (TFP) which may have unintended effects on pollution or energy; (b) emissions due to specific changes in process (such as innovations directly intended to reduce pollution emissions, for instance by improving the thermal efficiency of machinery).
The changes in energy consumption and pollution emissions over time can be decomposed into these effects (see for instance Stern b), but of course there are underlying causes that drive these factors, such as environmental regulations, changing preferences, growing environmental awareness, better knowledge, changed foreign trade patterns, and so on.
Our article examines the development of energy use and pollutant emissions over time in Sweden both in absolute levels and in terms of intensities (energy/GDP and pollutants/GDP). We investigate whether there are any EKC-type relationships in the long run in Sweden, either in terms of total emissions, which we call the strong EKC hypothesis, or in terms of emissions per unit income or income intensities, which we call the weak EKC hypothesis. In addition, we decompose energy intensity according to the principal factors presented above. When it comes to energy intensity the For environmental pollution in the long run there are some international datasets that have been created primarily for natural science purposes. Worthy of notice is the carbon dioxide emissions dataset developed by Marland et al. () and the sulphur dioxide emissions dataset produced by Lefohn et al. () . Lindmark's study is the first quantitative study of growth and pollution spanning more than one hundred years, which attempts to assign monetary values to pollution costs. In the medium to long term (post-) there have been some attempts to assess the changing costs of pollution over time, for instance Daly and Cobb's () calculation of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) for the USA from  to , followed up by other country studies (Cobb and Cobb , Jackson and Stymne , Castaneda , Hoffrén ).
.. Energy use and growth
The study of Swedish historical energy use incorporated both modern energy 'carriers', such as coal, oil and electricity, and traditional energy carriers like muscle-energy, firewood and direct-working water and wind (see Appendices A and D, and definition or p. ). Figure  shows the development of energy use over time, estimated according to Swedish official standards, Energy (S), and European standards, Energy (E). The differences concern whether electricity is accounted for in terms of its direct heat content (Swedish standard) or the heat content of the fuels that would be needed to produce the electricity (European standard). The graphs clearly show that there is no support for a strong EKC relationship for energy use in Sweden. Instead, there is a steady increase of energy use until the s, when energy demand flattens out.
It is also evident from Figure  that GDP experienced faster growth rates than energy consumption during the nineteenth century and the post- period. The relative developments, which are needed to test for a weak EKC relationship, are seen in Figure  , which depicts the development of energy intensity, including and excluding household energy consumption. The long-term development of energy intensity including household energy consumption shows an approximately linear decline with a total reduction of  per cent between  and . Around this declining trend there are two or three long-term fluctuations with substantial permanent declines in energy intensity taking place during both World Wars.
If household energy consumption is excluded, which is relevant if the energy requirements for production are focused on, the decline is less pronounced, but still substantial. This means there is no evidence of a weak EKC for Swedish energy as proposed by Reddy and Goldemberg () . Instead, a long-term decline is the pertinent feature, discernible from  Source: Kander (). GDP-series from Swedish Historical National Accounts, Krantz (, a, b, ), Ljungberg (), Pettersson () and Schön (, ) were provided by Lennart Schön. Virtually identical GDP series are found in Krantz () . Conversion to  Geary-Khamis international dollars is based on Maddison (). in the case of energy use, including household energy consumption, and more clearly from the First World War, when household energy is excluded. The finding of such a long-term decline is not totally unexpected in the case of Sweden, since a similar pattern was found by Martin () for the USA when firewood was included. This suggests that declining energy intensity is a pervasive feature that continues throughout modern economic growth and is not peculiar to high-income countries.
.. Carbon dioxide and growth
Energy use in itself is not an unambiguous environmental indicator. Simply put, fossil fuels tend to create numerous pollutant substances, while renewable energy is often less polluting. Considering renewable energy as completely unproblematic with respect to pollution is nevertheless erroneous. Extraction of renewable energy requires the building of hydroelectric dams, harvesting of firewood, the combustion of biomass and many other impacts. Pollution emissions caused by combustion of firewood are, therefore, considered in Section . that deals with the overall pattern of emissions. When we investigate the role of changing energy demand for pollution-related environmental problems, it is therefore relevant to examine the role of fossil fuels in total energy use. One of the most important and widely discussed pollutants is carbon dioxide, which in practice is more or less linearly dependant on fossil fuel energy inputs. The most severe impact of CO  is on the global climate. Although the theoretical reasons for a greenhouse effect, due to combustion of fossil fuels, were proposed in the s (Arrhenius ), CO  was not established as an environmental problem until the s. This makes it unlikely that environmental preferences have played a crucial role in explaining the reductions of CO  emissions in the long run. The first indication of evolving environmental preferences concerning CO  in Sweden did not appear until  with the introduction of the CO  tax. Nevertheless, CO  may reveal an EKC pattern, but it is worth noticing that such a pattern should not be interpreted as a direct indicator of changes in environmental demand, but rather as an effect of technical change, changing relative prices of energy carriers, and other structural economic factors. Figure  (upper panel) shows the historical development of fossil fuelrelated CO  emissions in Sweden. As seen from the graph, a strong inverted U shape curve is clearly distinguishable, with a late turn in the s. Even more pronounced is the pattern for the ratio of CO  to GDP in the bottom panel (see Appendices A and D). One main source of anthropogenic CO  emissions, besides fossil fuel combustion, is changes in land use. Land is covered by biomass and when the amount of biomass increases or decreases carbon dioxide is added to or removed from the atmosphere. Because of their large biomass to land ratio, forests have an especially high potential either to emit CO  , that is to work as a source for atmospheric CO  , or to sequester CO  , that is to work as a sink for it. Forest management thus constitutes one important way in which people have historically influenced atmospheric CO  concentration. When forestland is converted to other usage, such as agricultural fields or urban areas, some of its carbon is released into the atmosphere. In addition, tree density, or timber concentration of the forests, has changed substantially due to variations in forest management. The tree volumes of Swedish forests declined during the nineteenth century but increased again during the twentieth century. If the effects of this are included, the CO  intensity is profoundly different from when only emissions from fossil fuels are included (see Appendices A and D) . This is shown in Figure , 
.. Emissions of other pollutants and the eco-margin
In his investigation, Lindmark's point of departure is the concept of economic environmental historical accounting based on the System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA ), proposed by the UN, World Bank and others. The general assumption governing economic environmental accounting is that environmental problems are welfare issues. The environment is, therefore, treated in a similar way to other goods and services in the economy. Empirically, the investigation focuses on the long-term relationship between emissions of several pollutants and income, as well as on the monetary environmental accounting aggregate known as the 'eco-margin' and income. The eco-margin corresponds to the aggregated monetary value of degradation of the environment and depletion of natural resources. In this article, the eco-margin is limited to the effects of environmental degradation and does not take account of depletion of natural resources. Another aspect to bear in mind is that it accounts for pollutant emissions from production within the borders of Sweden, and
Energy consumption, pollution and growth in Sweden  some pollutants, like sulphur, are transboundary, which means that even if reductions in emissions take place in Sweden the level of pollution may not decline to the same degree, since for instance she receives SO  from Britain. Basically, the SEEA shows how different sectors interact with the environment by using environmental goods and emitting residual waste. The main accounting idea is that the environment is treated as capital, in SEEA parlance non-produced natural assets. Environmental damage is thus analogous to the System of National Accounts' (SNA ) concept 'use of capital', or depreciation. In short the SEEA is a combination of inputoutput tables, and accounts of non-financial assets. This makes it basically an extension of the asset boundaries used in the SNA accounts for stocks of fixed assets. The input-output tables show flows of environmental goods to the economy and flows of residuals (pollutants and waste) to the environment.
The question of how to estimate the environmental damage in monetary units is one of the most difficult and controversial issues in environmental accounting. Market prices are certainly the valuation approach that is preferred in the system of national accounts. Due to missing data, and even due to non-existing markets, environmental impacts do, however, require the use of imputed shadow prices. The main valuation principles that are recommended in the literature are avoidance costs (the cost of reducing environmental impact to acceptable levels) and damage costs (the reduction of the value of the environmental assets, in fact the assets' depreciation). Contingent valuation, based on willingness-to-pay is deemed unsuitable for national environmental accounting (SEEA ).
Proper data for either damage or avoidance costs are unlikely to be found for historical environmental accounting. Instead, Lindmark used environmental indicators linked to contemporary damage or avoidance costs. Since the mid-s various investigations have made elaborate assessments of avoidance cost in terms of either actual or imputed market prices. These costs have, thus, served as benchmark estimates that are used for weighting the historical emissions. The resulting series are, therefore, historical proxies for environmental damage, expressed as hypothetical contemporary avoidance costs. The pollutants included in the Swedish eco-margin are sulphur dioxide (SO  ), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrous oxides (NOx), lead (Pb), heavy metals (HM), biological oxygen-demanding emissions (BOD), nitrogen leakage from artificial fertilisers, volatile organic compounds (VOC) and particulate matter (PM) (see Appendices C and D).
The historical development of the eco-margin is shown in Figure  (upper panel). The main features of the eco-margin are increasing emissions until , pronounced fluctuations during the period -, and decreasing emissions from the late s/early s. The trend of the Eco-margin series therefore reveals the typical strong EKC-pattern over time. This shape is also reproduced if the Eco-margin is plotted as a function of income (Lindmark a) . The lower panel of Figure  shows the development of the eco-marginto-GDP ratio, which offers the following tentative interpretation. First of all there is a long-term decline of the eco-margin relative to GDP, similar to that reported for energy relative to GDP. In addition there are possibly three long-term fluctuations, from the second half of the nineteenth century and onwards. The first starts in  and peaks around , reaching its lowest point in approximately . It should also be noted that there is, tentatively, an even earlier phase that begins in approximately , peaks during the early s and ends around . The second long-term fluctuation occurs between approximately  and , with a peak around , while the third fluctuation occurs between  and the present, with a peak around .
. Empirical summary
In conclusion, strong EKC relationships were found for fossil fuel CO  and the eco-margin, while a strong EKC pattern could not be distinguished for energy use. In essence, energy consumption kept increasing in absolute terms, while the pollutant emissions reached a peak after which there was a decline.
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Turning to the weak EKC-hypothesis, there was no such obvious pattern except for fossil CO  . Both for energy use relative to GDP and the ecomargin relative to GDP there was instead a trend of continuous delinking, around which there were secular waves. In addition a relative delinking for CO  , including forestry, was detected.
Besides this general pattern of relative decline of energy intensity and the eco-margin, the results coincide in other respects. For instance, the long waves around the declining trend, found in the eco-margin-to-GDP ratio, can also be discerned for energy intensity, when household energy consumption is excluded. In addition the periods almost completely correspond. For both energy use and pollutant emissions the period after  is especially remarkable in that it is marked by a steady decline of absolute environmental emissions and by a rapid decline of the energyto-GDP ratio. This makes the period unique in comparison to all other phases.
. Analyses
First we analyse the factors behind the falling energy intensity, by decomposing the results into the effects of structural versus technical change in a broad sense, in Section .. Using the terminology presented in the Introduction this can be perceived as effects of changes in output mix versus the combined effects of changes in input mix and state of technology. Section . discusses the reasons why technical change results in a net decline in energy intensities in our historical case study.
In Section ., attention is directed to the different development of energy and pollutant emissions. In particular, we investigate why there has been a much more substantial relative decline of pollutant emissions than of energy use in relation to GDP, especially since the early s. Section . attempts to decompose the decline in pollutant emissions into effects directly related to energy versus other effects.
.. Decomposing energy intensity changes
It is possible to decompose the changes in energy intensity (excluding households) into technical and structural change. Both technical and structural changes occur simultaneously in economies over time, which means that in reality these changes are interrelated and difficult to separate. Technical changes often give rise to unbalanced productivity changes, which may change relative production costs and in interaction with the various price elasticities for different goods, lead to changes in relative prices and structural changes in final demand. Furthermore, technical change usually results in income increases, which through differences in income elasticities for 
various goods additionally affect the structure of final demand and thus the output structure. Finally, technical change may influence the demand for intermediate goods throughout the entire production chain. Taken together all these factors may lead to changes in the output structure. Given the fact that there are as yet no input-output tables for the Swedish Historical National Accounts, a decomposition bringing together changes in final demand (including foreign trade) and changes in intermediate consumption with changes in the output structure was not attempted. For the purpose of analysis it is, however, possible to undertake a static decomposition of changes in energy intensity due to changes in output structure and technical change at the sectoral level, similar to the analysis in Selden et al. () .
In a simplification, changes in energy intensity on the national level may partly be ascribed to variations in the sectoral shares, that is, structural changes, and partly to changes within the sectors, here labelled technical change. The high level of aggregation does certainly affect the possibility of distinguishing between structural changes and technical change, since the latter may include structural changes that would be revealed at a lower level of aggregation. Table  presents the results of the decomposition regarding the impact of structural changes and 'within sector changes' in the four sectors agriculture, industry, services, and transportation and communication (for calculations see Appendix B).
The results, which are presented in Table  , demonstrate that structural changes at the sector level were of little importance for the long-term decline in energy intensity. At the sector level they either counteracted the decrease in energy intensity or had no impact. Within the industrial sector, structural changes did contribute to the decline, but they were of minor importance compared to the changes within the branches (Schön ) .
Prior to the industrialisation of the Swedish economy, the impact of structural change was virtually non-existent. It was only during the period of rapid industrialisation (-) that structural changes played a decisive role in the increase in energy intensity. The impact of the relative growth of the industrial sector and of the transportation and communication sector was of the same magnitude as the total increase in energy intensity during this period.
The industrialised period from  to  saw declining energy intensity, due to changes within the sectors, despite structural shifts working in the opposite direction. The last period, -, the period of the proposed third industrial revolution, saw the largest reduction in energy intensity. Also worth noticing is that this reduction was entirely accomplished by changes within the sectors.
.. Technical change and energy intensity
The strong influence of technical change, or within sector changes, leads us to consider the factors driving such technological change. We find that the reason for the decline in national energy intensity in the long run in Sweden is that energy intensity declines within the principal sectors. It is not due to shifts in sector shares, which work in the opposite direction, increasing national energy intensity, but due to what takes place within those sectors.
The reason for a decline in energy intensity within the sectors may of course be structural changes within those sectors. This is the case in the industrial sector after  (Schön ), but for the other sectors this does not seem to be the case (Kander ); however, the lack of historical energy data at the sub-sector level hinders firm conclusions.
Why would then energy intensity decline within a homogenous sector in the long run? As stated in the introduction there are two main possibilities: () improvements in the state of technology, which in turn may be divided into (a) emissions-specific changes and (b) general productivity improvements, and () changes in input mix (movements along the isoquant of the production function). We will briefly discuss these aspects in their historical context.
(a) When it comes to historical energy intensity within sectors one obvious reason for decline is that the thermal efficiency (or the ratio of useful energy output to energy input) of the machines used within sectors has improved, as a direct result of energy-saving innovations. When such innovations were intended to reduce emissions, improved thermal efficiency is an example of emission-specific change.
 This means that less energy is needed for a specific work task. All human energy use entails a less than  per cent conversion efficiency due to the second law of thermodynamics. An improvement in thermal efficiency, therefore, means that less energy is wasted. There are economic incentives to reduce such energy losses, and  Thermal efficiency can also improve due to changes in the use of inputs within an existing technology, for example by adding insulation to a boiler.
an abundance of improvements in specific techniques has increased thermal efficiency over time (Smil ) . At first it may seem obvious that improvements in thermal efficiency will lead to decreases in energy intensity. A complicating factor is, however, that some of the savings will be eaten up by more consumption of energy services. Ever since Jevons () it has been well known that thermal efficiency gains do not necessarily reduce energy consumption, since energy services will become cheaper and hence be used more (Howarth , Herring ) ; at the least the reduction in consumption is less than the initial energy saved by the innovation. This rebound or take-back effect will manifest itself as structural change and growth of the economy. It may also to some extent hamper the decline of energy intensity, or the relative energy use, within individual economic sectors. The take-back effect is, however, not likely to be strong enough to outweigh all the effects on energy intensity of thermal efficiency improvements. This is, for one thing, because energy services are not only provided by energy, but also by capital (Neij ), which means that energy services do not get proportionally cheaper to the same extent as energy costs per se, because the necessary capital investments cost money. In addition, the money saved on energy bills is not likely to be used completely by consuming more energy services, since people have other wants and relative price changes take place across the economy.
(b) Another, neglected (but see Stern ) reason for declines in sectoral energy intensity in the long run is general productivity improvements (TFP increases). Ever since the development of the first TFP measures (Abramowitz , Solow ) we know that economic growth has occurred largely as a consequence of an increase in the quality of production factors both individually and combined (Denison , Crafts and O'Mahoney , Crafts ). This means that (L + K)/Y declines.  This may lead to an expectation of at least some decline in E/Y (energy intensity), because energy is used by machines and labour.
If energy was used in exact proportion to the production factors labour and capital, the consequences of TFP improvements on energy intensity would be very simple. In reality this is not the case. In order to figure out in more detail how TFP increases affect energy intensity it is therefore necessary to know how energy interacts with capital and labour.
We can hypothesise that the E/K ratio will decline, because increasing thermal efficiency will tend to increase the value of capital employed at the same time as the energy demands of the machines are reduced, so both the numerator and denominator work to lower the E/K ratio. Another aspect that affects the E/K ratio is changes in the composition of the capital stock, which may work either to increase or reduce the E/K ratio. Numerous studies have been performed that try to sort out the exact relationship  Where (L+K) is a weighted index of the inputs. between capital and energy, with varying results (Jorgenson , Berndt and Wood , Siddayo ). The debate has so far been hampered by a confusion regarding definitions of the elasticity of substitution (there are several different definitions) and consequently methods (Stern c). What we discuss here is not the tricky issue of whether energy and capital are substitutes or complements, but only the long-run changes of aggregate ratios such as E/K. This ratio has in fact declined in Sweden in the long run (Kander and Schön ) . Given this long-term relationship between energy and capital, it is quite likely that TFP increases lead also to a decline in energy intensity.
() Apart from technical change in the sense of production function shifts we have cases of factor substitution that may be perceived as movements along the isoquant of the production function. One relevant example of factor substitution, or perhaps a combination of factor substitution and technical change with biased shifts of production functions, with which economic historians are very familiar, is the development of the K/L ratio, which has increased substantially over time. This would lead to expectations of an increase in the E/L ratio as well. The increase in K/L may at first be assumed to increase energy intensity, rather than decrease it. It is true that replacing labour with machines, which require inanimate energy, leads to an increase in energy use unless human muscle energy is included. This study does, however, include human food consumption and then the answer to the question of the effects on energy intensity from such a substitution is not clear-cut. It depends for one thing on the actual effects on energy use, but it also depends on whether the value of production is affected by this substitution per se (rather than by the increased use of production factors in total) or not, which is a tricky issue. The effect on energy per se depends on the efficiency of 'biological machines', such as humans and animals, in transforming energy to work, compared with that of the inanimate machines that replace them. This has changed over the time encompassed by this study. When machines still had low thermal efficiency, and thus a large energy input was needed to operate one unit of capital, replacing workers with machines may have caused an increase in energy intensity. The effect should, however, have been reversed as machines reached higher average efficiency. It is difficult to determine when the increasing K/L ratio in general could reduce energy intensity, but it is clear that it occurred under our period of investigation, at the time when the average thermal efficiency became higher for inanimate machines than for animate machines, but before it counteracted the fall in energy intensity.

In conclusion, the most important reasons for the energy intensity decline within the sectors would be improvements in the state of technology, here  We know that thermal efficiency of modern machines is in the range of - per cent, while humans still only have thermal efficiencies of - per cent. exemplified by energy-related innovations that result in thermal efficiency gains together with general TFP improvements, while changing input mix, here the increasing K/L ratio, played a more ambiguous role over time. These long-run relationships between the factors of production and energy, together with relative price information and cost shares, are crucial for modelling growth in a correct manner. The integration of energy in production functions has been an issue since the s and the literature provides examples of various classes of production functions, perhaps most notably the KLEM production functions, which include energy as an input (Conrad and Unger ). Economic history can provide important lessons for such modelling by empirically showing what are the real trends of important factors in such models. Modelling can also provide answers to questions in economic history if applied to high quality datasets.
.. Energy and pollutants -why does their evolution differ?
The reason for the more substantial delinking of pollutants and GDP than of energy and GDP depends on a fundamental difference between the two kinds of indicators. While energy services are perceived as 'goods' (utility is derived from them), pollutants are either neglected or considered as 'bads'. The terminology has been used for explaining the EKC in economic theoretical terms (Kriström ) . This means that preferences are likely to work differently in relation to energy and to pollution. While people at higher income levels will prioritise pollution abatement, they may very well at the same time choose to increase their consumption of energy services, for instance by travelling more, having larger dwellings and using air conditioning.
It makes sense that people at higher incomes will care more about reducing pollution emissions than people at low-income levels, where survival is at stake or the prospects for higher material consumption are very tempting. With income increases, the marginal utility of increased consumption declines. It may also be that the disutility of pollution increases. That will depend on how bad or serious pollution is perceived to be in each case. This in turn can depend either on the actual state of the environment and/or the interpretation of these conditions. Historically people have sometimes put up with very bad environmental conditions, rationalising and defending them (Mosley ). Hence environmental history informs us that it has generally taken quite some time for an environmental problem to be established as a problem on the political agenda, sometimes - years after its discovery (Bolin et al. ) .
Another important aspect of environmental preferences is that technical development enables the adoption of more clean production methods at a relatively lower cost over time. Technologies diffuse internationally, which means that later industrialisers do not necessarily need to follow the path of Energy consumption, pollution and growth in Sweden  previous countries. This means that we should expect some time-dependent effect on pollutant emissions that is separate from the income-level effect.
Energy services and pollution emissions show differing behaviour for reasons other than those relating to income and the state of technology across countries over time. A recent household investigation in Sweden has shown that energy-saving behaviour has to do with lifestyle (busy people taking a shower instead of a bath) or upbringing (fathers being very angry if electric lights were not turned off): see Carlsson-Kanayama et al. . There is certainly need and scope for more empirical studies combining environmental behaviour with economics. Various kinds of path dependence, like upbringing or government actions, that shape and underlie the individual country performances, are likely to play an important role.
.. Energy versus pollutants after 
The period from the s onward is extraordinary when it comes to energy use and pollutant emissions. Energy intensity declined more rapidly in this period than in any period before and pollutant emissions declined even more. Especially for energy, and to some extent also for the emissions, it is likely that some explanatory power may be attributed to the microelectronic revolution. Its impact should have been threefold. First, microelectronics may enhance the fine-tuning of production, thereby reducing waste. Second, the new growth engines of the third industrial revolution, information technology and bio-technology, are knowledge intensive rather than material and energy intensive, which means that the industrial structure imposes less stress on the environment. Third, products of the new growth structure do not bring about as much energy consumption in final use, as did the typical products of the second industrial revolution such as refrigerators, washing machines and cars. The third industrial revolution is still only in its beginning, so it is difficult to quantify its historical impact on energy intensity and energy consumption. Still, it may have contributed to a fall of the energy to GDP ratio. The first two impacts also tend to reduce pollutants.
The more substantial decline of the eco-margin/GDP ratio than of energy/GDP after  may be related to the introduction of modern environmental legislation. Sweden introduced its first comprehensive environmental protection law in , which included air pollution, after more than sixty years of dispute in the Swedish Parliament. This increasing environmental awareness could in turn be the result of a high incomeelasticity of environmental demand paired with the high rates of economic growth during the s and s. Since economic development by the late s had caused a convergence of GDP per capita levels, the close timing of the launching of environmental legislation in many countries could be interpreted as a function of income levels. But the income effect may also have been reinforced in Sweden by changing environmental preferences in countries such as the USA and Britain, exemplified by the British  Clean Air Act. In turn, these developments may have affected preferences in countries like Sweden, despite the fact that the environmental problems were not as grave as in for instance London, and incomes not as high as in the USA.
Changes in the patterns of international trade have been suggested as an explanation of falling emissions in high-income countries. The role of foreign trade for the Swedish development of energy use and CO  emissions after  has been explored in two independent studies by the authors (Kander , Lindmark b), and in neither was any substantial impact of foreign trade found. Furthermore, Statistics Sweden (SCB ) has shown that exports contributed more to higher CO  emissions than imports did during the s.
To at least roughly examine some of the structural factors that affected the development of pollution between  and , the following exercise has been performed. First, we normalised the series for GDP, energy use, carbon dioxide, the eco-margin, and those pollutants that are clearly related to fossil fuels (index  = ). Then the increase between  and  in percentage terms was calculated. Finally, the change in pollutants was decomposed into the effects of (a) economic growth, (b) energy intensity and (c) fossil fuels' share of energy. The resulting residual, or what cannot be explained by these three factors, is interpreted as an indicator of changed environmental demand.
The increase in GDP during the period was nearly  per cent. In the counterfactual case of no other changes, the pollutant emissions would have increased as much. However, since energy intensity fell by . per cent and the share of fossil fuels in total energy consumption fell by  per cent, this would have resulted in a  per cent decline in the eco-margin. Since our estimates indicate that the eco-margin declined by almost  per cent, nearly  per cent of the reduction of pollutants cannot be explained by changes in the three factors above, which may not seem much. On the other hand this residual should definitely be interpreted as a minimum indicator of environmental preferences, since such preferences have also affected energy intensity and fossil fuels' share of energy use. Substantial governmental support was given to save energy from the s and energy taxes became environmentally differentiated during the s. Thus, energy taxes do not only have the purpose of raising state revenues and reducing the foreign trade deficit by making imports more expensive, but are also designed with environmental targets in mind. Environmental concerns also played a role with regard to both hydro-electricity and nuclear power. Additionally, the eco-margin utilises avoidance costs for the weighting, rather than prices that reflect the negative welfare contributions of the bad outputs. It is, therefore, relevant to look at the unexplained residual for some of the individual pollutant emissions that constitute the eco-margin. Here we find that environmental demand contributed to nearly  per cent of the reductions in SO  , PM and heavy metal emissions. On the other hand, NOx and VOC changed less than the effect of the structural factors. These emissions are both related to road traffic. Thus, the disutility of the pollutants must have been low compared to the utility of road traffic. Additionally, it is likely that the avoidance costs were high prior to the introduction of catalytic converters, which became common only in the late s.
In conclusion, this decomposition exercise has provided at least circumstantial evidence of growing environmental preferences after , apart from those directly related to energy use.
.. Future research possibilities
This study shows long-term interrelated declines in energy use and pollutant emissions relative to economic output and presents an explanation for this phenomenon, and might, therefore, be seen as delivering a very optimistic message. However, we emphasise that the speed of this relative decline may not be fast enough to actually reduce pollution emissions. And our results show that total energy use has increased though in recent decades emissions of pollutants have declined. From an environmental perspective it is relevant to study periods with especially rapid declines in emissions to see what can be learnt from them. It would, for instance, be of interest to explore the permanent effects of crises, such as World Wars and oil crises, and determine what relative roles policy and market forces played in these periods.
It would also be of value to extend the research to comparative country studies, to investigate similarities and differences across nations, something that would also provide an insight into the relative impact of different policies.
. Conclusions
This article has shown that both energy intensity and pollution intensity have declined over the last two hundred years in Sweden. In absolute terms both energy use and pollutant emissions increased up until  after which energy consumption flattened out, while pollutant emissions declined.
The combined results, therefore, suggest that the development of pollutants was to a large extent determined by energy use and the composition of energy 'carriers' (see Appendix A) up until . It is, therefore, likely that the environment was attributed a low value in Sweden until the s. The observation that pollutants started to decrease thereafter, while energy consumption stabilised, suggests an increasing value attributed to the environment and that deliberate action involving monetary costs were taken in order to prevent further pollution. The difference between the development of energy use and pollutant emissions since the s also suggests that neither a transition to a service economy nor changes in foreign trade can be the main explanation for the apparent EKC relation found for pollutant emissions. This is further illuminated by the decomposition of the changes in energy intensity for the period -, in which the relative effects of changes in output structure versus changes within the main economic sectors (agriculture, industry, services and transport and communication) were determined. During the period - both agriculture and manufacturing industries contributed to decreasing energy intensity, while effects from structural changes on the sectoral level were negligible. During the industrialisation period - there was an increase of energy intensity since the transport and communication sector experienced the highest increases of energy intensity at the same time as overall structural change also accentuated energy intensity. The industrialised period from  to  revealed small changes in all sectors, apart from transport and communications where energy intensity at this time decreased. Structural changes did, however, contribute to an increase in energy intensity. The last period, which is presumably the post-industrial phase, showed a considerable decrease of energy intensity foremost in manufacturing industry, while the impact from structural change was negligible. The service sector in this period did not increase its share in constant prices, which also shows that the decline of pollutant emissions in this period could not have been caused by a general move towards a service economy. The overall finding in our study is thus that structural changes at the sectoral level have either counteracted or had a negligible effect on negative trends in energy intensity during the last two hundred years. The long-term decline was caused by technical change in a wide sense, consisting both of improvements in TFP and thermal efficiency.
The decline in pollutants after  was decomposed into the effects of growth, energy intensity, the fossil fuels-to-energy ratio, and a residual interpreted as non-energy-related environmental preferences. This decomposition showed that expressed preferences for environmental quality changed during this time. Welfare accounts by definition take preferences into account, so this suggests that welfare is incorrectly measured if the negative value of 'bad' output is not included. If productivity were measured on the basis of both bad and good outputs this could show that productivity performance during the dismal s and troublesome s was not as poor as previously believed. 
Appendix A: Energy carriers and CO  emissions
The 'carrier' is the physical medium conveying the energy, as listed below. The term 'carrier' is preferred to 'source' because it gives less annotation of original source; for instance, electricity is a secondary energy carrier.
Firewood
Household firewood consumption: the series is modelled for the period - and after that based on real investigations. The model departs from an investigation in  and uses four relevant factors to extrapolate the values backwards: () heating work, which increased as more rooms were heated; () efficiency of stoves (large effect from the diffusion of more efficient stoves); () coal for firewood substitution; () population distribution (numbers increased relatively more in the cold north). Service sector firewood consumption is modelled as a function of household firewood consumption, which takes into account that larger residences are a more likely outcome of increased income/per capita in the long run than a larger heated area per employee in the service sector. An assumption is made of even heating standard development in services and households until the turn of the century, after which heating standards in households developed more quickly. One rationale for this assumption is that many service premises were initially not heated at all, but became increasingly so.
Industrial firewood consumption is well documented in statistics from the s. For dates before that Schön (, ) has modelled industrial firewood consumption based on relative energy savings in the metal industry, which is the largest firewood consuming branch, and constant energy intensities in the other branches.
The energy content of firewood varies due to kind of wood and humidity. Here we use the figure . GJ/m (solid wood).
Muscle energy
Draught animals, such as horses and oxen, are regarded as animate machines, combusting fodder. The muscle energy for animals is calculated as the energy content of their fodder. Their subsistence energy should also be regarded as necessary energy input for their work. The changing size of animals and changing intensity of work are included in the model.
Fodder demands for animals are often presented in fodder units (fu). One fu equals the digestible content of  kg barley, which is , kcal. A  kg ox with a medium working load needs  fu per day and a horse of the same size and work intensity requires  fu per day. In the early nineteenth century animals weighed only around - kg and consequently they consumed less energy, which is included in the modelling.
For humans, on the other hand, only that share of food which is consumed during work is calculated as energy consumption in the formal economy, and the rest is attributed to final energy consumption (household consumption). Changes in work hours are included in the modelling. Humans' average food consumption is calculated at , kcal/day. Work intensity is assumed to have increased linearly until  so that average food intake then was . × , kcal and then declined back to , kcal in . Investigations show that  per cent of all human time in Sweden was devoted to work between  and . In  it was  per cent and in  it was  per cent. For the period - we have assumed a linear increase from  per cent to  per cent, due to the industrial revolution.
Direct working water and wind
From statistical figures of direct working water in industry around  it is evident that this energy consumption only amounted to around . per cent of total energy at the time. This is within the error margin of firewood consumption, so this energy is not modelled here. Direct wind for sails may be substantial, but has so far been omitted for theoretical and practical reasons.
Peat
Peat consumption was never very large in Sweden, despite large areas of peat land. The energy content of peat was very low compared to firewood, which was available in large amounts. Statistics are available from the s and then the amount is less than  per cent of total energy consumption. It is still included from then onwards.
Coal
Imported coal is well documented in the statistics. The energy content of imported black coal was  GJ/ton and the energy of coke and anthracite was  GJ/ton. Domestic coal was produced in small quantities in Scania, and its energy content was  GJ/ton.
Oil
Practically all oil was imported, and this is well documented in the statistics. Sweden only had marginal assets of shale oil, with an oil content of  per cent, and this was never of any importance. The energy content of raw oil is  GJ/ton. Not all oil is used for energy purposes; some is used as raw material and this share has been subtracted from the imports or the refining statistics of Sweden.
Electricity
Electricity production is well documented in the statistics. Electricity is a secondary energy carrier, produced from primary energy sources like fuel, hydropower and nuclear power. There are thus two principal ways of accounting for its energy content: either you calculate the heat content of the electricity per se or the energy content of the primary energy carriers used for its production. In either case it is important to know and subtract the share of electricity produced by fuels, when calculating aggregate energy consumption, in order to avoid double calculations. Here the method of just calculating the heat content of electricity, el (h), is used, but the other method is also explored in Kander ().
Large amounts of energy-rich waste is produced in the paper and pulp industry, called spent pulping liquor. This energy has increasingly been employed in this industry and the amount is substantial in relation to total energy consumption. For instance, in  it made up  per cent of total Swedish energy consumption.
Natural gas
Like many other countries, Sweden used to produce gas from fossil fuels, which need not be taken into account here, since this is only a refinement of primary energy sources already accounted for. From  she has imported natural gas, but only in small amounts. In  natural gas made up  per cent of total energy consumption.
CO  emissions from energy
CO  emissions can easily be calculated if the amounts of various energy sources are known, because all carbon eventually becomes CO  . The emission factors used for the various fuels are the following (g CO  /MJ): coal , coke , raw oil  and natural gas . Firewood does not produce any net CO  if the trees are replaced with new ones.
CO  emissions from forests
A forest with a constant amount of trees does not produce any net CO emissions. When the timber volume increases the forest acts as a sink for CO  and when it decreases it works as a source. Standing timber volumes declined in Sweden during the period - and then increased again, almost reaching the same level in  as in . The emissions (positive or negative) can be calculated on the basis of  m  (solid) wood = . tons CO  . Since forest investigations ( and onwards) as well as the estimates for the nineteenth century are only available for some benchmarks, the changes in tree volumes between those years are divided by the number of years. This gives the graphs of forest-related CO  emissions stable properties.
Appendix B: Decomposition analyses
The relative effects of between-sector changes and within-sector changes for changes in energy intensity are calculated in three steps. The first step is to calculate the relative effects of changes in the sector structure with respect to changes within all sectors together. The second step is to calculate the relative importance of changes within each sector. The third step is to combine the results of the first two calculations.
The information needed for the first step is energy consumption at the sector level, which is presented in Table B, and energy intensities in constant prices, which are provided in Table B . Kander () . Comment: Dwelling usage is excluded from the service sector, since the energy connected to that service is accounted for as final energy consumption by households. The power industry is excluded from the industrial sector, since energy is the outcome of that branch and is studied in relation to the sectors. The building and construction sector is included in the industry sector. Each sector has been deflated separately and its production in constant prices has been proportionally adjusted so the sums equal GDP, minus dwelling usage and the power industry. The choice of price level year will provide different energy intensity results, which are shown in Table B . While relative changes within the sectors are not affected by the choice of price level years, the relative sizes of the sectors are. Choosing different price level years will yield different responses to the question of the relative impact of changes within and between sectors on total changes in energy intensity. The most appropriate method is to choose a price level year within the period under scrutiny, for example at the beginning or the end. Therefore, early base years were chosen.

European Review of Economic History
The first step can be calculated in two different ways:
() One possibility is to hold sector shares constant according to the initial year of the period. The overall energy intensity that would be the outcome at the end of the period is calculated and compared to the actual energy intensity. The relative importance of structural changes at the sector level of the economy may be calculated directly this way, while the relative importance of changes within sectors, or technical change, is a residual, that is, what is not explained by structural changes.
() Another possible calculation is to hold sector energy intensities constant according to the initial year of the examined period. The results in the final year are compared to the sectors' actual energy intensities and their relative deviations are calculated. This allows the relative effects of changes within the sectors, that is, technical change, to be calculated directly. In this calculation, the relative importance of structural changes at the sector level is a residual, that is, what is not explained by technical change.
Unfortunately these two calculations do not produce quite the same result when it comes to the overall question of the relative effects of changes within and between sectors. This may be perceived as a kind of index problem. Table B presents the results of the second method, which is used here.
The second step, aimed at determining the relative importance of each sector for the 'within sector' variable above, is presented in 
Appendix C: Environmental accounting
The basic approach followed is the SEEA version based on avoidance cost accounting. The main accounting aggregate is the Environmentally Adjusted Net Product (EDP), which is the Net National Product (NNP) less consumption of natural capital, that is, environmental costs or the eco-margin, valued at contemporary avoidance costs. Ideally, damage costs should have been used. These were at the time of the investigation fewer in number than the avoidance cost investigations, which is why the latter were chosen. Conceptually, the environmental costs are reflecting mid-s preferences and technology. In the original work an attempt to estimate natural resource rents for iron ore and virgin forests were also made. This approach is not compatible with the avoidance cost concept, which is why costs for natural resource depletion are not included in this article.
The procedure followed was to estimate indices for various pollutant emissions, linking these to emission level benchmarks. Finally the emissions were weighted by avoidance costs. The preferred cost data are those reflecting the estimated costs for reaching the goals set by the Environmental Protection Agency in Sweden. Appropriate data for these indices have been elaborated separately for each pollutant. The most common procedure, however, has been to perform a back-cast based on benchmark observation of emission levels, often distributed over various forms of emission sources. In many cases the costs were, however, estimated on basis of mainly American investigations, due to lack of Swedish investigations at the time.
It is worth noting that avoidance cost investigation draws on different assumptions and can be expected to vary over time. International comparisons therefore require a common set of cost weights. The approach in which contemporary avoidance costs are used should be seen as preliminary. One goal in a co-operative project (called The Dynamics of the Environmental Kuznets Curve in Sweden) between Umeå University and the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences is therefore to use econometric methods for estimating historical environmental shadow prices (Balk et al. () . Environmental Performance in Swedish Manufacturing -. Arbetsrapport , Department of Forest Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Umeå).
The environmental costs for the nineteenth century are composed of () a coal consumption index linked in  to the combined costs of fossil fuel related emissions (SO  , NOx, Fine Particulate, CO and CO  ) () an index of urban population linked to BOD, and () a firewood consumption index linked to VOC emissions.
Table C summarises the main approaches and sources used for emission estimates and avoidance cost. 
